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6
The possession heuristic
jam e s e. k r i e r a n d c h r i s to p h e r s e r k i n
1. Introduction
A heuristic, as Daniel Kahneman (2011: 98) observes, “is a simple procedure that helps ﬁnd adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difﬁcult
questions.” Kahneman is a psychologist, one of a handful of scholars who
have brought heuristics to the attention of a general audience, thanks in
large part to several books (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Gilovich,
Drifﬁn, and Kahneman 2002). Just as Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 ideas about
paradigms in the history of science are fodder for academics in all sorts of
ﬁelds (this for better or worse), so too for Kahneman and company’s ideas
about heuristics, and legal academics are among the wide audience of
consumers. Witness a host of articles and several books, including the
recently published Heuristics and the Law (Gigerenzer and Engel 2006; see
also, e.g., Chapter 5; Sunstein 2000; Kelman 2011).
We join the crowd here, examining the role of possession as a heuristic
in the law of property. While heuristics-and-the-law is the subject of
considerable scholarship, much of the work is mainly about heuristics,
drawing in occasional examples from the law. Examples from property
law in general, let alone possession in particular, usually ﬁgure very little.
Thus, we have found no mention of a possession heuristic in the legal
literature, although there are scattered references in work by psychologists.1 But we are talking about property law, particularly the role it
assigns to possession. Our discussion of possession as a heuristic is
informed more by theories of possession than by theories of heuristics,
and our aim is a contribution to the former, not the latter. We take
heuristics in the sense Kahneman suggests. They are simple decisionmaking strategies devised to solve complex problems. Since the law of
Krier is Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School. Serkin is
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School.
1
See, e.g., Friedman and Neary (2008: 829), discussing a “ﬁrst possession” heuristic whereby
people treat things as belonging to the person who ﬁrst possessed them.
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property is essentially the law of belongings, its ﬁrst task is to determine
to whom things belong. There are all sorts of complicated inquiries that
could be undertaken to ﬁgure out and justify an incredible range of
answers to this question. Alternatively, there is a simple inquiry that
provides a simple answer: a thing belongs to its possessor.
This is the possession heuristic.

2. Evolution and the possession heuristic
2.1. Regarding animals (other than humans)
Evolutionary game theory suggests why there might be a possession heuristic. Consider an account by John Maynard Smith (1982). His model supposes two animals of the same species, each of which aims to occupy a
particular breeding site. The value of that site to its occupant is the gain it
promises in reproductive ﬁtness as compared to the next best alternative
site. The probability that either of the two animals will be the ﬁrst to occupy
the site is given as equal, and either animal might be either an aggressive
Hawk or a passive Dove. Hawks ﬁght over territory until one is injured and
retreats, and in a Hawk/Hawk contest, each competitor has an equal chance
of winning or losing. Losing carries the cost of reduced reproductive ﬁtness.
Doves do not ﬁght; they avoid injury by giving in to Hawks or by sharing
with other Doves. On these assumptions, Maynard Smith argues, natural
selection will lead the species to evolve in the direction of a Hawk-Dove
hybrid, a “Bourgeois” type that acts as a Hawk when in possession but as a
Dove when not – this because the Bourgeois strategy (whereby animals
protect what they possess but defer to what others possess) is better than any
alternative. Bourgeois types “avoid more damaging encounters than the
pure Hawks and win more encounters than pure doves” (Krier 2009: 153).
Bourgeois strategy is said to be evolutionarily stable, meaning that once it is
established, natural selection forecloses invasion by any mutant strategy.2
Two points must be noted: ﬁrst, the outcome described above depends
on a stock of breeding sites of sufﬁcient number that the value of sites is
less than the cost of ﬁghting over them.3 Second, and more pertinent for
2

3

The discussion of evolution and the possession heuristic is drawn from Krier (2009),
which itself relies heavily on the literature cited in this section.
Notice the contrast with Demsetz’s (1967) argument that property rights develop in response
to resource scarcity. See also Ellickson (2013: 9 n.41) for the suggestion that increasing scarcity
might be accompanied by heightened defense of resources, increasing the costs of ﬁghting to
the point that they remain larger than the value of the resources in question.
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our purposes, the outcome depends on the asymmetry of occupant
and latecomer, which signals to a contestant the role (Hawk or Dove)
an opponent is likely to play. Where this asymmetry holds, a behavioral
pattern (a “norm”) of deference to possessors can develop spontaneously
and persist simply as the consequence of self-interested individual
action.4

2.2. Regarding human animals
The late Jack Hirshleifer, though skeptical to some degree of the HawkDove-Bourgeois account, conceded, “[o]n the human level, a corresponding environmental situation might be expected to lead to a ‘social ethic’
supporting a system of property rights” (Hirschleifer 1982: 23). Robert
Sugden (2004 [1986]) pursues that line of thought in a book published a
few years after Hirshleifer’s remark. Sugden alters Maynard Smith’s
(1980) model to ﬁt the human context by substituting utility for reproductive ﬁtness, and by assuming that effective strategies develop through
imitation and learning as opposed to biological natural selection. Having
done so, he reaches conclusions much like those of Maynard Smith:
repeated play would likely lead to a convention – a de facto rule – of
deference to possessors. David Hume, he notes, had long ago anticipated
his argument.5
Of particular interest to us is Sugden’s discussion of possession as the
crucial asymmetry. Given any number of asymmetries (the difference
between a strong contestant and a weak one, an attractive contestant and
an ugly one, a loud contestant and a quiet one, a greedy contestant and a
generous one, a rich contestant and a needy one, and so on), why settle
on possession as the decisive factor? Sugden’s answer begins with the
observation that the purpose of a convention is to guide behavior. To
perform that function, the asymmetry underlying the convention must
be prominently apparent. Hume thought possession worked well in this
4

5

That the behavioral pattern can develop does not mean that it will, and it is a fact that
there seem to be few examples of species known to defer to possession. This could mean
that the underlying model is not developed in a sufﬁciently discriminating fashion, or it
could mean that appearances are not what they might at ﬁrst seem.
Unlike Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who imagined modes of governance reached by
group agreement or imposed by central authorities, Hume argued that decisions made by
self-interested individuals each choosing on his own could lead to successful strategies for
cooperation and coordination; Hume called these strategies “conventions” (Hume 1978
[1740]: bk. 3, pt. 2, §2).
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respect (its salience led people to converge on it), and Sugden agrees.
The idea is to ﬁnd a simple strategy for assigning objects to people, and
there is “a natural prominence to solutions that base the assignment on
some pre-existing relation between persons and objects,” namely possession, which, because it is usually unambiguous, provides a clear indication of the status of any claimant (Sugden 2004 [1986]: 95–107).
The norm of deference to possession, in its simplest form, did not
amount to much in terms of what it provided; it would have been
“problematic in the case of land . . . and also when attention switches
from the acquisition to the maintenance of possession” (Posner 2000:
545–46). As to land, the norm would seem to protect only what the
possessor physically occupies, and even then only so long as the possessor is actually there. As to chattels, one can actually possess only a few.
In both cases, then, ongoing vigilance and control could be relaxed only
at the peril of losing what one had managed to obtain. This fault
was ﬁxed by extending the essence of possession to include constructive
possession evidenced by prominent signals that identiﬁed things as
subject to a standing claim – branding and such in the case of chattels;
building, fencing, and tilling in the case of land. Actual physical occupation was no longer necessary to trigger the possession heuristic, meaning
the security it provided was “permanent” rather than “transient”
(Blackstone 1765–69: *3–7).

3. Possession, priority, and ownership
The foregoing suggests how early humans arrived at a de facto norm of
deference to possession (eventually including constructive possession)
well before the appearance of formal legal systems.6 We can be conﬁdent
that adherence to the norm was hardly perfect. Probably deference was
most regular among small, close-knit groups (Ellickson 1991: 177–78),
whose members we might liken to conspeciﬁcs in the case of nonhuman
animals. And group members probably differentiated between insiders
and outsiders, deferring to possessors in their clan, but not to those in
other clans.7 Hence, conﬂict could co-exist with cooperation, thanks in
6
7

See also Epstein (1979, 2006: 147–49) and Rose (1985).
A striking example is the taking of North America by European settlers. Deference to
possession was standard practice on the continent (put aside the occasional war), but not
when it came to dealings with such primitives as the Native Americans. The settlers rested
their claim to America on discovery (a conventional means by which to acquire property),

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 17 Aug 2021 at 13:15:26, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316017814.007

the possession heuristic

153

particular to the invention of constructive possession. Simply picture
the situation where a possessor is temporarily absent, and another person
comes along and takes possession, whether because of misunderstanding
or bad intentions. In either event, the result is a new possessor who might
claim the right to what in fact another already (constructively) possesses.
The resolution is plain: if constructive possession is to mean anything,
it must mean that as between the two contestants, the ﬁrst possessor
should prevail.
We do not know how this principle was put into operation in de facto
regimes that had developed a norm of deference but had not yet arrived
at something like a “government” to resolve disputes of the sort
described. What is clear, however, is that de facto became de jure with
the gradual emergence of governing authorities (in other words, of
states), and formal property regimes have regularly adopted as legal rules
what primitives had adopted as customs. Those legal rules protect possession, including constructive possession, and formalize a principle of
priority to resolve contests arising from sequential possession. Exactly as
we should expect, the principle considers the claim of the prior possessor
to be superior to the claim of the subsequent possessor. The superior
claimant is said to have “title” to the thing in question – relative, at least,
to the second possessor, and absent a voluntary transfer by the former to
the latter.8
This doctrine of relative title is sometimes said to give a possessor
“title good as against all but the true owner,” but that is misleading: the
“true owner” is no one but the prior possessor relative to the subsequent
possessor. If we put context aside, “true owner” simply designates the
person whose possession is subsequent to no one’s. As Holmes put
the point, rights acquired by possession “continue to prevail against all
the world but one, until something has happened sufﬁcient to divest
ownership” (Holmes 1831/1938: 238). Holmes saw where his observation
led. “The consequences attached to possession are substantially those
attached to ownership,” at least according to the common law (Holmes

8

notwithstanding that natives already inhabited the discovered land. This was unproblematic for the settlers, who reasoned that the natives were mere occupants, not possessors,
and that move spelled end game. The settlers were entitled, if necessary, to enforce their
rights of possession by conquest. It was left to Chief Justice Marshall to explain (and
apologize) in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
This conclusion holds even where the prior possessor had acquired the item in question by
earlier stealing it from a third party, a point discussed more fully in Section 4.2.
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1831/1938: 241).9 We venture to say, however, that the proposition holds
more or less in the case of virtually any property regime, formal or
informal; it is a cultural universal. Possession kick starts property.
So what is “property”? To put the question in terms like Holmes’, what
are “the rights acquired by possession,” the “consequences . . . attached to
ownership”? Conventionally, they are three: the right to exclude, the right
to use, and the right to transfer (the last two rights would seem to follow
necessarily from the ﬁrst) (Merrill 1998). None of these rights is without
limitation,10 but each is extensive, and the force of the state backs all.11
The package of rights can be justiﬁed, or on the other hand criticized, on
various grounds, but we leave those matters to our concluding section.

4. Applications, problems, and ﬁxes
Here we consider some examples of the possession heuristic at work in
the common law of property, look at some problems to which the
heuristic gives rise, and consider some ﬁxes. By and large, our examples
are drawn from relatively simple situations, because they are the most
illustrative. They come from four doctrinal categories, and each category
tends to put its own particular light on the possession heuristic. With
respect to all of the categories, however, we see the courts more or less
taking the possession heuristic as it developed de facto and applying it de
jure.12 The courts, in short, made the heuristic their own to a considerable degree. Perhaps they thought it wise to inform the law by looking to
9

10

11

12

Throughout this chapter, we focus our discussion on the common law, as opposed to the
civil law of many countries. For comparative discussions of possession in the common
and civil law, see, e.g., Holmes (1938: 206–46); Posner (2000: 535–67); Gordley and
Mattei (1996: 293–334); Chapter 4 and Smith (2012).
For example, the right to exclude is limited by rules privileging trespass in the event of
necessity, and by prohibitions against racial discrimination in certain circumstances; the
right to use is limited by the law of waste and the law of nuisance; the right to transfer is
limited by (again) prohibitions against racial discrimination, and by rules against restrictions on alienability.
The rights could exist, of course, yet not be backed by the state, but instead by self-help
that the state explicitly or implicitly allows.
De jure adoption by courts of a de facto heuristic used by ordinary people in everyday
affairs has ﬁgured at least a little in the heuristics literature. A “group report” on the
subject (Haidt 2006) supposes, as have we, that common law courts might have relied
considerably on informal lay heuristics in carrying out their formal legal work, because
the lay heuristics are simple and often work in practice to achieve what the courts saw as
desirable ends, although normative constraints limit to some degree what courts may and
should do.
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lay intuitions and norms; perhaps they considered the heuristic to be,
in any event, an apt means to resolve the conﬂicts that came before them;
or perhaps for both of these reasons, or for others not apparent to us.

4.1.

Capture

Under the common law, and consistent with the possession heuristic,
landowners have possession (or constructive possession) of any resources
on, over, and under their parcels. Notice the incentives that result. Since
any landowner reaps all the gains from using his parcel wisely, and bears
all the losses from neglect, we expect he will manage his belongings
wisely, if for no reason other than a self-interested aim to maximize their
value to him. This is a neat picture from the standpoint of efﬁciency, but
it frays at the edges. Even the most diligent landowners will ﬁnd it
difﬁcult or impossible to manage all that they possess, because land
parcels often have on them some resources, which, unlike the land itself,
are not ﬁxed in place; hence, they can escape an owner’s possession. Who
owns them, once they are removed from the land?13
The answer is provided by the rule of capture, the domain of which is
so-called fugitive resources like wild animals, water, oil, and gas. Provided such resources are captured off a landowner’s parcel, they belong to
the capturer as ﬁrst possessor. We will modify this statement shortly, but
ﬁrst observe its consequences. Once resources move off an owner’s land,
they change status from the owner’s private property to everybody’s
common property (the default rule of common property is that anyone
may take and use the resources free of interference by anyone else). This
changes incentives for the worse, because anyone who exploits a
common resource gets all the gains therefrom, yet (unlike the situation
of an individual owner) bears only a fraction of the losses, since they are
spread over all the commoners. The predictable consequence is socially
wasteful overconsumption.
Whether or not the common law courts fully appreciated this disturbing feature of the possession heuristic, they acted as if they did,
13

The discussion in this and later sections takes a lesson from the arguments in Section 3,
and thus uses the term “owner” to designate the person with the relatively best title in the
circumstances under examination. Moreover, we regard the owner as having individual
(not shared) ownership of a particular parcel of land or other resource. At the other
extreme is the open-access or universal commons, open to all; this is not really a property
regime since no one has the right to exclude. In between the extremes is the limitedaccess commons. (See Section 4.3.)
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developing rules that helped counter the problems presented by fugitive
resources. As one might expect, these adaptive new rules usually operated
by extending the idea of constructive possession. The rules were nice but
also limited ﬁxes and they were sometimes applied in clumsy and unsatisfactory ways. We can illustrate both observations by looking ﬁrst at
some examples regarding wild animals, and then considering oil and gas
(with a glance at water, another fugitive resource).
Suppose an owner of a large parcel of land frequented by deer. The
deer, while on that parcel, are in the constructive possession of the
landowner, as we have seen. But suppose further that the landowner
has granted permission to various hunters to hunt for the deer on this
land, and that one of those hunters has snared a deer and taken it home
alive, hoping eventually to build a small herd of deer to be corralled on
his, the hunter’s, own land. That hunter who ﬁrst captured the deer
becomes its owner by virtue of the possession heuristic. It matters not
that some other hunters had also tried to capture the deer in question –
indeed had begun their efforts before the successful hunter began his.
The common law rule, illustrated by the famous case of Pierson v. Post,14
is that the animal goes to the ﬁrst hunter to capture it, whether by kill,
mortal wound, or trap. The dissenting judge in the case was of a different
mind, arguing that the ﬁrst hunter to chase with a reasonable prospect of
capture should be entitled to the animal if his efforts ultimately succeed.
He reasoned (incorrectly) that otherwise no one would hunt.15 The
majority (correctly) thought otherwise, and in any event believed that
the dissenting judge’s rule would be too difﬁcult to apply. It chose the
ﬁrst-to-capture rule “for the sake of certainty,” noting that the alternative
rule of ﬁrst-to-pursue “would prove a fertile source of quarrels and
litigation.” (This statement illustrates an important feature of the possession heuristic already noted: a claim based on possession is relatively
cheat-proof, difﬁcult to feign, as compared to claims based on who was
ﬁrst to pursue, who was most likely to capture, and so on.)16
14
15

16

3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (1805).
The idea that no one would hunt calls to mind Yogi Berra’s idea that nobody eats at a
certain restaurant because it is too busy. In fact, the rule of capture generally has led not
to inactivity but rather to over-exploitation and over-investment in capture technology in
any number of documented instances.
Consider also the rule of increase, according to which the owner of a female animal also
owns her offspring, no matter who owned the male animal. The rule so holds, in part,
because it is easier to determine the female source of the offspring than it is the male
source.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 17 Aug 2021 at 13:15:26, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316017814.007

the possession heuristic

157

Back to our hunter who snared a deer. He eventually realizes his hopes
of building a herd. His deer reproduce, and they develop a comfortable
attachment to the corral that is their home. Matters reach the point
where the hunter can let his deer out during the day to graze wherever
they like, because they return habitually in the evening. They have
acquired, as the law speaks of it, the animus revertendi. They have been
domesticated.
But a domestic species of animal (such as a cow) is one thing, and a
domestic individual of a wild species another.17 Suppose a person
hunting for deer under just the circumstances of our original situation
comes upon one of the domestic deer and captures it, only to have his
possession challenged by the hunter who built the herd and kept it
corralled each night. Now the rule is that, because the deer in question
had the animus revertendi, it belongs still to the owner of the herd. This is
a considerable extension of constructive possession; it lets an owner of
domesticated animals secure his possession of them with a very long but
entirely invisible leash. The doctrine of animus revertendi is untroubling
in the case of domestic species (cows again), because it is reasonable to
attribute to hunters knowledge that certain animals are not wild and up
for grabs. The doctrine is also untroubling in instances where the domesticated individual of a wild species is clearly marked in a way that
suggests its status – a bell on a collar around its neck, a prominent brand
on its side. In both of these instances, the existence of a prior possessor is
apparent – an important feature in the development and application of
the possession heuristic. Yet the courts seem not always to insist on such
measures, nor commentators to criticize their failure to do so. Probably
they accept animus revertendi as a suitable means to reach a productive
end, namely domestication of animals. Yet when so clumsily applied, the
rule results in uncertainty, the costs of which the owners of the animals in
question can most cheaply avoid.
A related example of the possession heuristic in the case of animals has
to do with a wild animal that has no habit of return and is taken by a
hunter out of the animal’s native territory. The animal has escaped the
clutches of an owner keeping it and its kind for commercial purposes. The
owner shows up to claim the animal from the hunter, and the question
boils down to whether the animal’s status as a foreigner put the hunter on
notice that it belongs to someone, and forecloses the hunter’s objection
17

For an evolutionary account of the domestication of animals, see, e.g., Ellickson (2013:
1–25).
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that the animal has returned to its natural state. The answer is easy and
obvious in the case of a hunter who shoots a giraffe grazing in an Iowa
cornﬁeld. It is more difﬁcult in the case of a silver fox native to Canada,
owned by a fur rancher in Colorado, and captured by a trapper in the latter
state. Our sense of the cases is that courts have some interest in protecting
important local industries, so the Colorado trapper might well lose to the
Colorado rancher. And perhaps it is right to suppose that trappers should
know whereof they seek, just as we expect ﬁshermen to be aware of the
difference between a largemouth bass regulated by one set of ﬁshing rules
and a smallmouth bass regulated by another.
Legislative and administrative regulation is the chief means by which
the legal system aims to alleviate an undesirable consequence of the rule
of capture in the case of wild animals – overhunting. If anything, the
common law rules have worked as much to provoke undue consumption
as to limit it, as is evident in judge-made rules regarding interference with
capture. Allegations of interference with capture are bound to arise from
the very nature of the rule of capture itself. A hunter is after wild game,
and just as he readies for the kill an interloper appears and kills ﬁrst. Or,
a hunter is after wild game, and just as he readies for the kill an interloper
scares the animal off. The difference between the two cases has been
important to the courts, which tend to rule that in the ﬁrst case the
interloper wins, whereas in the second the hunter has a remedy, say in
damages equal to the value of the lost opportunity. The point of the set of
rulings is clear: in the ﬁrst case, there is a successful capture, whereas in
the second there is not, and since capture seems to be the purpose in
mind (after all, hunting laws license the activity), the courts are happy to
judge in light of the consequences. If the outcome of a contest is that,
despite the interference, one person or another has managed to make the
kill, all to the good; but if, thanks to the interference, neither has, all to
the bad.18 Unless, of course, the resource in question is scarce, in which
case conservation, as opposed to capture, might be the better social end.
Yet common law courts have been reluctant to consider scarcity in
applying their rules about interference with capture. In short, judges
were content to invent the rule of capture in regimes of abundance that
made it sensible, yet unwilling to change their minds when the foundations of the rule of capture began to crumble, and thanks in part to the
judges’ invention!

18

See Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1707); Krier (1997).
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A response, of course, is that legislatures have intervened in various
respects (hunting regulations, conservation laws to protect endangered
species, and so forth), but the effective reach of these measures is limited
in that legislative jurisdiction has an insufﬁcient reach in some important
instances. The best example, perhaps, is ocean ﬁsheries, productive
management of which calls for international cooperation of a sort difﬁcult to realize. And so we witness overﬁshing, and overinvestment in
ﬁshing capital, each a predictable consequence of the rule of capture.
Now consider the rule of capture as applied to oil and gas resources.
The story here is much the same as that for wild game, so our account
can be brief. Oil and gas resources were discovered to be useful long after
the basic rules of capture of wild animals were laid down, but their
fugitive nature led the courts to treat them in the same fashion. So, in
an early case the court reasoned that oil and gas were, after all, just like
foxes and deer – resources ferae naturae – in that “they have the power
and the tendency to escape without the volition of the owners.” What
followed from the analogy (which the court hoped was “not too fanciful”)
was plain:
[Oil and gas] belong to the owner of the land, and are part of it, so long as
they are on and in it, and are subject to his control; but when they escape,
and go into other land, or come under another’s control, the title of the
former owner is gone. Possession of the land, therefore, is not necessarily
possession of the gas [and oil]. If an adjoining, or even a distant, owner
drills his own land, and taps your gas [or oil], so that it comes into his well
and under his control, it is no longer yours, but his.19

From the standpoint of efﬁcient use, this extension of the rule of capture
was not always problematic. If the pool of oil or gas happened to be
located entirely within the boundaries of an owner’s land (which boundaries are said, with some hyperbole, to stretch up to the heavens and
down to the center of the earth), then, as noted in Section 3, we could
expect productive management. But usually oil and gas are found in vast
common pools that lie under many parcels of land belonging to many
individual owners. The rule of capture as applied by the court in Westmoreland turned these common pools into common property, thus
inviting the sorts of ills we considered earlier in connection with wild
animals. Drillers could be expected to capture as much as they could
before others did so, and, as part of that aim, to overinvest in capture

19

Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Company v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
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technology, drilling multiple wells where a single owner would use fewer;
they could store what they captured in tanks to save the resources for
another day. However, an owner of a private pool could store more
economically by leaving the resources in the ground until demand
justiﬁed extraction.
The ills of common ownership were in principle avoidable, though
perhaps at the cost of undue concentrations of wealth in lucky drillers.
The courts could have said that the ﬁrst to tap into a pool owns all of its
contents, whatever their reach – in short, that the ﬁrst to drill successfully
had captured not just the ﬂow from the pool, but the stock of the pool itself
(Lueck 1995: 396–97, 422).20 But given the state of the relevant sciences in
the nineteenth century, this approach would have been difﬁcult if not
impossible in practice. There was no reliable means to identify the boundaries of any given pool, and thus to differentiate one stock from another.
Courts did do what little they could to privatize common pools,
primarily by way of the so-called bottoming rule. A landowner (or his
licensee) could drill down only through his own parcel, never crossing
over into the subterranean territory of neighbors (who had the right to
exclude). Assuming one could accurately monitor the angle of a well (and
it seems the courts thought this possible), the bottoming rule helped
avoid common-pool problems. The rule protected pools that were in fact
private (located entirely under a single parcel of land) from lateral
drilling, and the rule turned de jure common pools into de facto private
ones in instances where drilling was not practical on neighboring land
perched over a common pool, say because of natural barriers such as
impenetrable rock. So the bottoming rule helped alleviate common-pool
problems, but did not overcome them entirely. Observing this, at least a
few courts aimed at a fuller remedy, limiting excessive drilling into and
extraction from what could be identiﬁed as common pools. Eventually,
however, and as with wild animals, legislative bodies stepped in to
regulate extraction, primarily by unitization of oil and gas ﬁelds. Unitization aims to achieve efﬁcient management of common pools by
forcing multiple owners to act, in essence, as a single owner would.21
20

21

Compare underground caves that extend beneath many parcels of land. On one view, the
cave belongs in common to all owners of the overlying land. On another view, the entire
cave belongs as a stock to the owner of the land on which sits the entrance to the cave, or
to the ﬁrst landowner to discover the cave and open it to access. See Edwards v. Sims, 24
S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1929); Edwards v. Lee’s Admr., 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936).
For a discussion of similar problems and responses in the case of ground and surface
waters, see Dukeminier, Krier, Alexander, and Schill (2010: 37–38).
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4.2. Finders
The folk saying is “ﬁnders keepers, losers weepers,” and no doubt this is
often the reality. The law, however, runs to the contrary. Early in the
eighteenth century, an English court announced the rule that has prevailed ever since: a ﬁnder does not have “absolute property or ownership,
yet he has such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but the
rightful owner.”22 We noted in Section 3 that this statement is misleading, if not ﬂat-out wrong, as the law of ﬁnders illustrates. Suppose that A
is “the rightful owner” of an item and loses it, that B ﬁnds the lost item
and takes possession but then loses it, and that C then ﬁnds it. B learns of
C’s ﬁnd and sues to recover the item. The statement from the Armory
case clearly holds that B wins against C, but it also clearly holds that C
wins against B. Each of them, after all, is a ﬁnder, and neither of them is
“the rightful owner”! The absurd result is avoided by stating the rule
correctly: a ﬁnder wins as against all but prior possessors. Therefore, B
prevails over C, and A over B, according to the doctrine of relative title
discussed in Section 3.
It is interesting to note that the doctrine of relative title holds even if a
person in the chain of title is a thief, provided the theft was not committed against the person making a claim.23 If, in our example above, C in
the suit by B wishes to show that B had stolen the item in question from
A, the evidence will not be heard, and for good reason. If C were allowed
to show that B had stolen the item, it would follow that B should be
allowed to show that A had stolen it as well, from X, and A to show that X
also had stolen it, from Y, and so on. Efforts to disallow protection of a
thief’s prior possession could result in an endless enterprise.
This is why courts hold, in a suit by a prior possessor against a
subsequent possessor, that the latter may not use a jus tertii defense in
support of his own possessory title by showing that his adversary’s title is
in fact in some third party (jus tertii means “a right of a third party”). Yet
even astute observers seem to overlook the point of this sensible rule. So
Judge Richard Posner asks whether a “wrongful possessor” should prevail
over a subsequent lawful ﬁnder, and answers, “Presumably not; depriving
him of possession is the only feasible sanction for his initial wrongful act,
and the prospect of such deprivation may be the only feasible deterrent

22
23

Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505 (1722).
Yun-chien Chang, in Chapter 4, offers a different view of wrongful possession, and sees
no reason to protect prior wrongful possessors.
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against wrongful takings”(Posner 2000: 557). But how does Posner know
that the “wrongful possessor” was indeed wrongful? He knows only
because he asks in his example for us to “suppose” this! Hypothetical
problems make life so much simpler than reality, as judges should well
understand. In any event, how does Posner know that the wrongful
possessor did not get possession by ﬁnding what had been lost by another
wrongful possessor? He doesn’t.
A particularly interesting feature of ﬁnders cases is that “the rightful
owner” (the most prior of all possessors) is seldom on the scene. There
are few reported ﬁnders cases arising from suits by “rightful owners,” no
doubt in part because their claims are indisputable and thus not litigated.
Most commonly, the cases involve a series of possessors each claiming
not to own but only to have rights of possession relatively better than
their adversaries have, by virtue of being prior in time. And usually, but
not always, this means lawsuits between a ﬁnder and the owner of the
locus where an item was found. The English common-law judges made a
proper spectacle of themselves as they struggled to determine who, as
between locus owner and ﬁnder, was the prior possessor of the item in
question, for it always came down to that – prior possession. (Unhappily,
their reasoning spread like a virus to the New World.) Was it the locus
owner by virtue of constructive possession, or the ﬁnder by virtue of
actual possession? Might it matter (it might) whether the found item was
attached to or under the ground or lying on the surface? Was the locus a
private place, a public one, or something in between? (The intentions of
the locus owner, judges thought, might vary as a function of this,
although sometimes they said it was irrelevant.) Was the ﬁnd by a servant
of the locus owner, and, if so, was the servant in the course of service, or
outside it? Did the locus owner know of the thing found? (Sometimes this
mattered and sometimes not, judging from various opinions.) Did it
appear that the found item had been abandoned, meaning there was
no “true owner”?
These questions, and the various and often contradictory answers
courts developed in response, are bewildering. Consider the plight of
the judge in Hannah v. Peel, an English case.24 His job was to determine
whether it was the ﬁnder, or rather the locus owner, who was the prior
possessor of a brooch found by the former in the home of the latter. After
working dutifully through the precedents, he concluded with a startling

24

[1945] K.B. 509.
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but perfectly understandable observation: “A discussion of the merits,”
he said, “does not seem to help”!
What, exactly, are the merits? One answer, incontestable as far as we
can see, is that the great ﬁrst principle of the law of ﬁnders is to protect
the rights of “true owners,” which is to say, in this instance, the person
who lost possession of the item in question. We presume that the
common law rules of ﬁnders developed with this end in mind, yet no
one (we include ourselves) has been able to see or to show how the design
of the rules reﬂects or advances that ambition. The conventional law – at
least, the common law rules, as opposed to various legislative measures –
displays a formalistic architecture, as opposed to an instrumental or
functional one. At least a few courts have noted this and have chosen
to design alternative rules by self-consciously and transparently
reasoning from desired ends to suitable means.
An example of the instrumental approach is McAvoy v. Medina,25
which involved a wallet found on a table by a customer in a barbershop.
The judge noted the usual rule “that the ﬁnder of lost property has a valid
claim to the same against all the world but the true owner.” But here, the
judge observed, the wallet was not lost but mislaid; its owner voluntarily
placed it on the table. Accordingly, the ﬁnder was not entitled to take the
wallet from the shop; rather, the barber had a duty to hold it safely until
its owner returned. “We accept this,” the judge concluded, “as the better
rule, and especially as one better adapted to secure the rights of the true
owner.” The reasoning is clear: the real owner, realizing the absence of
his wallet, will retrace his steps and ﬁnd it where he left it.
That does seem plain on ﬁrst glance, but it doesn’t stand up to closer
observation. Instrumental reasoning is ﬁne if it is informed by careful
attention to how people actually think and behave under the constraints
of legal rules. The judges who created the mislaid rule, however, were
careless in these respects.
First, the mislaid rule requires a judge to determine whether a found
item was lost, or rather was mislaid, a task easy enough on the facts of
McAvoy but not in a host of other cases that might arise (a woman’s
purse under the chair where she sat in a restaurant; a small package
found under the seat in a theater, and so on).
Second, there is no reason to engage in costly musing over ambiguous
facts when the purpose behind the mislaid rule shows it to be

25

93 Mass. (11 Allen) 548 (1866).
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unnecessary. Consider: whether found items were mislaid or lost, surely
their owners would try to retrace their steps. Owners who have mislaid
might be more likely to succeed than owners who have lost, but owners
who have lost are much more likely to ﬁnd their items if they remain
where they were lost than if they do not! Hence, the McAvoy rule should
be applied regardless.
Third, perhaps it should not be applied at all. Courts commonly read
the rule to hold that “a ﬁnder of property acquires no rights in mislaid
property.”26 If the owner retraces, the property is his; if he does not, it
remains where it was mislaid. The owner of the locus gets to keep it
forever. Hence, ﬁnders announce their ﬁnd at their peril, which hardly
gives them incentives to disclose, and disclosure is the crucial ﬁrst step in
protecting the rights of owners who have lost or mislaid their goods.
We would say that the McAvoy case is that rare thing, a perfectly
incorrect decision. This hasn’t stopped learned authorities from agreeing
with it. The late Walter Wheeler Cook (1935: 524) considered it “obvious
[note the conﬁdence!] that from the point of view of social policy the
shopkeeper ought to be preferred to the customer, as in that event the
article would be more likely to get back into the possession of the real
owners.”27 Judge Posner (2000: 556) also seems to endorse the lostmislaid distinction to some degree, although he wonders why the ﬁnder
of a mislaid item could not just leave his name and address so that the
owner of the item can track him down. But that could be done as well in
cases of lost goods, a point Posner leaves unmentioned, perhaps because
he takes “lost” to mean, “that the owner doesn’t realize the property is
missing,” and so “is unlikely to search for it.” Posner has a strange
deﬁnition of lost, and an odd sense of how losers act.
Since protection of the possessory interests of those who lose or mislay
belongings depends on disclosure by ﬁnders, we have to consider their
incentives to disclose. They might be inclined to disclose on pain of being
charged with theft, but the probability of such charges in most cases will
be almost zero; or they might be inclined to disclose on pain of feeling
guilty, which depends on how well they have been socialized. In any
event, the law puts ﬁnders in a double bind: they are cheaters if they don’t
disclose and fools if they do. Finders would have heightened incentives to
26
27

See, e.g., Michael v. First Chicago Corp., 487 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ill. App. 1985).
Cook should have known better. After all, he had both legal and scientiﬁc training
(mathematics and physics) and was a specialist in the application of scientiﬁc methods
to the study of law. He taught at such august law schools as Chicago, Columbia, and Yale.
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disclose if owners were required to pay a reward in order to reclaim
possession. Some civil law countries do this, but the common law
requires no reward unless one had been promised. One could argue also
that ﬁnders are encouraged to disclose by the fact that they will win in
the end, guilt free, if no true owner shows up (which is probably often the
case). The problem is that even in those circumstances there is no
guarantee, since found items might be awarded to locus owners instead,
either because the items are judged mislaid, or because the owner of the
locus is judged to be the prior possessor. One could escape the latter
difﬁculty by barring claims by locus owners, but doing so would dash the
justiﬁed expectations of people who ﬁgure, usually with good reason, that
what is on their land belongs to them, at least as against mere ﬁnders.
The possession heuristic as conventionally applied by the courts leaves
them incapable of resolving the dilemmas of ﬁnders law, and for a very
simple reason. The courts see possession as all or nothing: either the
ﬁnder is the prior possessor and thus prevails, or the locus owner is the
prior possessor and thus prevails, period. The consequence of this formalistic viewpoint is that it forecloses what would almost always be the
best outcome – that each party has a claim to half as between themselves,
and ultimately as to the so-called true owner of the item if he does not
appear to make a claim within a reasonable time. If the true owner does
show up within that time, we would require that he pay a reasonable
reward, itself to be divided between the ﬁnder and the owner of the locus.
In the meantime, found items, whether deemed lost or mislaid, should
be held either in a public repository, or in the place where they were
found. This is plain common sense, on any number of grounds. It is the
way we would expect well-socialized individuals to resolve the matter
on their own. It would increase the incentives of ﬁnders to disclose.
It would acknowledge the expectations of locus owners. It would
provide closure.28

4.3. Shared possession
The case we just made for sharing between ﬁnders and locus owners
rests on purely instrumental reasoning. Some commentators, looking
for a doctrinal hook on which to hang the approach, ﬁnd it in “the
concept of joint ﬁnding” (Helmholtz 1983: 324). However expressed,
28

For a similar proposal, see Helmholtz (1983).
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the result is (at least for a time) a regime of shared possessory rights,
a kind of concurrent ownership.
Concurrent ownership is a regular feature of property law as to both
land and personal property (bank accounts, for example). It appears in
several forms in the common law system – the most ordinary being
tenancy in common and joint tenancy – but the distinctions between the
two are not important to our discussion. The important feature is that
both forms involve shared possession, and it should be apparent from
our discussion in Section 4.1 that concurrent ownership (as with socalled common property generally) can be problematic from the standpoint of efﬁcient resource management. Good management requires
concurrent owners to cooperate – to act, in essence, as would a single
owner – but this can be difﬁcult to achieve, especially when there are
many individuals sharing possession, but also when there are few.29
The common law contains some default rules presumably designed to
cope with this problem. The underlying principle is that the possessory
rights of co-owners are undivided, meaning each is entitled to use all of
the property subject only to the exact same entitlement in the others.
Regularly, though, one co-owner’s use necessarily conﬂicts with another
co-owner’s use, yet the principle provides no guidance whatsoever on
the question of who should prevail.30 This is probably why the default
rules developed to animate the principle are confusing, inconsistent, and
unpredictable in their application, meaning co-owners would be well
advised to sidestep the rules by making agreements among themselves.
If they cannot agree, then – happily – the law leaves a way out. Every
joint tenant or tenant in common has a unilateral right to exit by
partition, which results in divided ownership in severalty.31 This is one
of the great default rules of the common law.

29

30

31

This is not to say that co-owners of a limited-access commons (open to members only)
never manage to coordinate, even when there is a considerable number of them. See, e.g.,
Ostrom (1990). Nor should it be taken to suggest that such commons do not have
considerable virtues, such as economies of scale, risk spreading, and the pleasures of
working in consort.
The same difﬁculty arises from the central (and useless) principle of nuisance law, that one
should use one’s own property in such a way as not to injure the property of another.
Some states recognize tenancy by the entireties, a form of co-ownership available only to
husband and wife. In a tenancy by the entireties, neither husband nor wife may act
unilaterally with respect to the property. Perhaps this encourages cooperation, but if it
fails in this respect, partition is not an option unless both spouses agree. During their
joint lives, the only unilateral move available to either is divorce.
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Concurrent ownership is a productive regime provided the owners are
people who tend to get along well together. If the messy default rules of
the common law have a virtue, it is that they nudge uncooperative types
to get out of the co-owner game altogether.

4.4.

Adverse possession

Adverse possession doctrine holds that an owner can lose his land to a
subsequent possessor who enters without the owner’s permission, provided the entry is actual, apparent, hostile, and continuous for a period set
by a statute of limitations.32 The result is, effectively, a forced transfer,
seemingly inconsistent with the possession heuristic and its set of rights.
Actually, the contrary is the case. It is true that adverse possession doctrine
compromises security of possession, but it is equally true that it also
enhances security of possession – namely in all cases where the claim to
some belonging happens to trace back to the actions of a distant dispossessor. The aim of the doctrine – and of statutes of limitations generally –
is closure, and for good reasons. With the passage of time and the
accompanying deterioration of relevant evidence, the facts of the status
quo ante become increasingly difﬁcult to determine. Moreover, during that
same time various transactions in the property usually will have been made
in reliance on appearances. Reversing these, especially given uncertainty
about what really occurred back at the outset, would usually be unsettling,
and in the case of land, particularly so. Hence, adverse possession helps
more than it hurts, once the social beneﬁts of quieting title are taken into
account. Adverse possession is not an indispensable means to achieving
closure (see, e.g., Stake 2001), but it is a useful one.
Still, the doctrine does effectuate forced transfers, and this has moved
its defenders to develop several other justiﬁcations for adverse possession
over the years, each of them aiming to show that the transfers are a good
thing in themselves, without regard to the aim of quieting title.33 One
such argument is that an erstwhile owner has no grounds to complain,
32

33

We should mention that constructive possession also comes into play in adverse possession law. Under the “color of title” doctrine, one who actually enters just a portion of
land, under a deed or other instrument that purports to convey all the land but happens
to be ineffective, nevertheless is said to possess all the land that is described in the
instrument, subject to various limitations.
The forced transfers lead critics, especially lay critics, to complain that adverse possession
amounts to “legalized theft.” The complaint overlooks the fact that theft itself is legalized
theft once a statute of limitations forecloses criminal prosecution for theft and civil
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having left his land idle while he slept on his rights. A second argument
looks at the other side of the matter, holding that the adverse possessor
has earned his reward by putting the land to productive use.34 These
views – sometimes called the “sleeping” and “earning” theories, respectively – have introduced undesirable distractions into the American law of
adverse possession. For example, and probably thanks to both theories,
judicial decisions and legislative requirements commonly reﬂect the view
(at times only implicit) that active use of land is especially meritorious,
when in fact leaving land undeveloped is often the more efﬁcient course.
Beyond that, the earning theory in particular has led some jurisdictions
to require good faith as an element of adverse possession,35 and to
require privity among a series of adverse possessors in order for them
to tack together their periods of “earning” ultimate title. The English law
does neither, because it wisely views adverse possession as a means to
quiet title, and nothing more.

5. Possession and property
As we noted in the Introduction, the law of property is the law of
belongings, and its ﬁrst task is to determine to whom things belong.
The possession heuristic provides the answer: a thing belongs to its
possessor.36 That person, being an owner in the sense described in our
discussion, has rights that necessarily accompany the status of owner – to
exclude, to use, and to transfer. A virtue of the possession heuristic (of
any heuristic) is its simplicity. It calls for no attention whatsoever to any
number of considerations that could be relevant to determining who in

34

35

36

actions for conversion of the item in question. Yet it seems that only when the item in
question is land do people get their backs up.
A third (and more recent) argument (in two variations, both offering interpretations of
Holmes [1897: 476–77]) asserts that, given the passage of time, the adverse possessor
likely gains more utility in keeping the land than the former owner loses in having to give
it up (Posner 2011: 98; Ellickson 1989: 39; see also Stake 2001: 2455–71).
In odd contrast, some jurisdictions insist on bad faith on the part of adverse possessors,
requiring them to prove that they knew the land in question did not belong to them when
they entered it. In our view (and that of many courts), any inquiry into the subjective
mental state of adverse possessors is undesirable, since it is usually impossible to assess
what was the actual state of mind of the adverse possessor at the time of entry. In any
event, there was a cause of action against the entrant no matter his mental state, so the
statute of limitations should begin to run.
For discussions in the same vein, though not cast in terms of heuristics, see Epstein
(1979) and Rose (1985).
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society is entitled to what – who in any particular instance might justly
deserve the entitlement, have the greatest need for it, attach the highest
value to it, or make the most efﬁcient use of it. That the possession
heuristic ignores these factors does not mean that it serves nothing but
convenience. Quite to the contrary, the rules on possession and the rights
that accompany it (to exclude, use, and transfer) are commonly justiﬁed
in terms of desert (e.g., Sugden 2004: 99–101); efﬁciency (e.g., Posner
2011: 41), individual autonomy (e.g., Friedman 1962: ch. 1) and human
ﬂourishing generally (e.g., Alexander 2009a). In particular instances
where applying the possession heuristic seems unjustiﬁed from the
viewpoint of any of those terms, modiﬁcations can be (and regularly
are) made, whether by courts or legislatures.
In the language of the heuristics literature, the modiﬁcations are
usually products of a switch from one system of problem solving to
another, the two being referred to as System 1 and System 2 (see, e.g.,
Kahneman 2011: 20–21). S1 refers to problem solving by means of
heuristics, whereas S2 is characterized by self-conscious attention to a
variety of considerations. S1, then, is simple, and S2 is complex. The law
of property, writ large, employs both systems, meaning property amounts
to more than just possession and its default incidents.
Discussions of S1 and S2 run throughout the heuristics literature, but it
is best for our purposes to focus instead on an ongoing debate among
property theorists about the comparative advantages and disadvantages
of the two systems. The debate is not framed in terms of S1 and S2, but it
could as well be. The debate, as we see it, is about simplicity versus
complexity, and how to realize the virtues of each. Here we present the
contending views in a brief and somewhat stylized account, drawing on
some of the work of Tom Merrill and Henry Smith, who favor S1, and
Gregory Alexander and Hanoch Dagan, who favor S2.37 For convenience,
we refer to the two camps as M&S and A&D, respectively.
M&S begin with the in rem nature of property rights. The rights are
good against the world, and this requires that their substantive content be
readily accessible and intelligible to third parties to guide them in their
behavior and expectations – in particular, to inform them what belongs
to them and what does not, and with what consequences. M&S construct
an entire theory of property based on this observation, a theory with both
descriptive and normative elements. For example, they have argued, on

37

Alexander (2009a); Dagan (2007); Merrill and Smith (2003, 2000); Smith (2012, 2009).
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the basis of many examples, that the law of estates is designed to limit the
forms of ownership to a short and conventional list, this in order to
minimize the information costs that would arise if owners and others had
to deal with a large collection of novelties (Merrill and Smith 2000: 8).
They claim elsewhere that this constraint is rooted in morality. “Property
can function as property only if the vast preponderance of persons
recognize that property is a moral right . . . [and] the morality upon
which it rests must be simple and accessible to all members of the
community” (Merrill and Smith 2007: 1850). While few would characterize the law of estates as “simple” or “accessible to the community,”
their central insight is persuasive: property’s moral and practical force
depends on its overall intelligibility.
A&D, on the other hand, consider property to be a complex, contextdependent set of rights and obligations intended to promote “human
ﬂourishing” (Alexander 2009a: 760). They build on the legal realists, who
characterized property as a “bundle of sticks,” a set of relational interests
that might be personal and not solely in rem. For example, property
usually includes the right to exclude, but need not always do so if
exclusion is inconsistent with larger social concerns. So the court in State
v. Shack38 was justiﬁed in thwarting the wishes of a landowner who
wanted to exclude social workers seeking to speak with migrants laboring
on his land. And property can (and, they argue, does) entail, as a “social
obligation,” an afﬁrmative duty to preserve open space or to share
resources that are sufﬁciently important to the community (Dagan
1999: 768–78; Alexander and Peñalver 2009: 148). The content and
normative underpinnings of these claims are well developed in the
literature, so we need not rehearse them here (Serkin 2013). It is plain
that their method of resolving conﬂicting property claims can sometimes
involve far more complex analysis than does the M&S method, which
usually relies on a simple right of exclusion.39
Notice that each point of view has some key elements. M&S object to
the relational approach (in personam as opposed to in rem) at least in
part because it is neither easy to apply nor easy to discern. The approach
uses uncertain standards that make property rights contingent and
relatively uninformative for everyday purposes. Usually it is better to
38
39

277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
Merrill and Smith both separately acknowledge the important role of complexity in legal
systems, but reject it for the possession and the creation of bare property rights (Chapter 1;
Smith 2012: 1694).
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use simple rules to govern behavior and avoid disputes. A&D object
to the narrow-mindedness of the foregoing; they are willing to tolerate
more complexity in the content and speciﬁcation of property rights, in
order to take account of social welfare considerations too often ignored
by simple rules.
Actually, the differences between the debaters are not as stark as our
outline suggests, nor as the protagonists claim to believe. Their arguments (and it is worth noting that each side tends to caricature the views
of the other side) are cast in the form of deep ontological disagreement
about the very nature of property, about its “core” versus its “periphery.”
Framing the debate in such high-stakes terms is a distraction. The reality
is that property, in form and practice, is a mixed system, as both sides
acknowledge.40 Merrill expands this very point in his contribution to this
book, offering an information-cost account of the relationship between
property and possession (Chapter 1). Property reﬂects no singular ideological commitment. Methodologically, it reﬂects a division of labor
between S1 and S2 problem solving. It is, to be sure, more rule-bound
than most of the common law, and no doubt for the reasons M&S
suggest. Yet it repeatedly resorts to standards, as any property scholar
knows. Sometimes the switch from bright-line rules to more vague
standards occurs precisely where S1 thinking breaks down.41 We speculate that careful investigation would show that S1 dominates some
substantive areas of property law (such as the law of capture and ﬁnders),
and S2 others (the law of servitudes comes to mind). We also speculate
that observed patterns of dominance could usefully be explained by
reference to the very ideas brought out in the work of M&S and A&D
alike (see, e.g., Sterk 2013).
To us, the interesting question is the degree to which the two different
approaches to resolving property disputes can be accommodated in a
manner that compromises the central concerns of neither. The sort of
property system envisioned by M&S – a system that relies considerably
40

41

For example, M&S concede there are occasional limitations on the right to exclude (e.g.,
Smith 2009: 971), and A&D acknowledge the ongoing relevance of a general right to
exclude in most cases (e.g., Alexander 2009b: 1063–69). Moreover, A&D’s examples of
“afﬁrmative obligations” usually are not afﬁrmative at all; rather they take the form of
additional limitations on the right to exclude, regarding which recall the discussion in
footnote 10.
It is possible – as one of us has argued – that bright-line protection for existing uses, as
opposed to the ad hoc protection of prospective uses, is best justiﬁed by similar behavioral
intuitions (Serkin 2009: 1267–70).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 17 Aug 2021 at 13:15:26, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316017814.007

172

james e. krier and christopher serkin

on the S1 methodology – is robust. It works well most of the time,
meaning that a switch to the S2 methodology called for by A&D seldom
would be necessary. Adding occasional complexity to the core understanding of property hardly undermines its utility as a simple and
instructive system. Even decisions based on S2 methodology can ﬁt
themselves into the basic S1 system. In particular categories of cases,
standards can be applied in a manner so regular and consistent as to
become in essence rules, such that the ex post approach evolves into ex
ante rules, while still leaving some ﬂex in the system.
An interesting feature of the property debate sketched in this section is
that the contending parties both present a view based not just on
normative but also on positive theory. Each side, that is, claims to be
describing how our present property system actually works. And each
side is correct. If property law required people in all their interactions to
depend on S2 reasoning instead of S1 intuitions, the friction in the
system would soon become unbearable; but so too, if the situation were
turned the other way around. However, the study of heuristics demonstrates that there is a role for both methods, simultaneously, and our
property system works all the better for it.
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